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EDITORIAL 
Pulling Together 
The West has three broad options in responding to Soviet 
pressure and its military build-up. It can do nothing, hoping to be 
left in peace; it can respond solely in the military field; or the West 
can approach the problem through a broad and flexible strategy 
which embraces all aspects of political confrontation—military, dip-
lomatic, psychological, economic, trade and cultural. 
The first option is always attractive to those who prefer not to 
face facts and is encouraged by those who do not want us to 
recognize Soviet policy for what it is. It would in practice open the 
door to the Sovietization of the West, depriving us of control over 
our own destinies. Flora Lewis, reporting Polish peoples' reactions 
to Western attendance of a Pugwash conference in Warsaw, tells 
how a shabbily dressed worker pointed to riot police and their 
exploding gas canisters and warned: "The West is stupid. This will 
come to you, the way you're going."1 
A purely military response would have to overcome the hand-
icap of mobilizing democratic societies in economic distress against 
an opponent who cares neither about consumer and welfare de-
mands nor about domestic public opinion. The Soviets capitalize on 
this Western difficulty: indeed their military strength is their only 
claim to superpower status. The West does need to improve its 
military preparedness, particularly its conventional forces in Europe 
and its worldwide response capability, but it would be foolish to 
restrict its strategy to the one area where Soviet strength is greatest. 
In March of last year the Centre for Conflict Studies hosted a 
Workshop to examine low-intensity methods of resisting the Soviet 
threat; in effect, the third option. Conclusions pointed to a need 
for the West to move in this direction, thus minimizing war risks 
by directing conflict into less dangerous forms, and permitting the 
Alliance to develop a positive rather than a reactive strategy.2 Events 
since then have underlined the need for a well coordinated long-
term policy acceptable to most Western nations. 
It is therefore distressing to see this third option grasped by 
the United States, only to be in shreds a few months later. The 
debate over the Soviet natural gas pipeline to West Europe is well 
reported elsewhere.3 Sufficient to say that the US position is correct 
in theory and the European view is right in practice. This is because, 
having blessed the project at its inception, it was too late for America 
to cry halt when the contracts had been signed and much work 
completed. T o be sure, Soviet behaviour since 1979 justifies a 
sharply revised Western approach to East-West trade. But this new 
approach has to be agreed by major Alliance partners in advance 
of implementation, and it must not be seriously damaging to West-
ern interests. United States leadership, which is sorely needed, has 
not been enhanced by crude attempts to apply extra-territorial 
s 
Jurisdiction, by an apparent greater willingness to restrict European 
trade than United States, and by a failure to perceive that in this 
form of East-West conflict, willing cooperation amongst allies is 
essential to success. Moreover, in long overdue efforts to broadcast 
true facts to Cubans, the US Administration is drawing fire from 
many quarters,4 the upgrading of its international broadcasting 
capabilities has lagged,5 and there is no broad domestic understand-
ing, far less consensus, behind the move to carry East-West com-
petition into new fields. At home and abroad, the American 
Government needs a roving ambassador of great moral stature and 
persuasive power, to explain that, if we are to avoid choosing 
between defeat and nuclear war, we have to recognize and accept 
new duties. 
Throughout much of the second world war, the Western Allies 
argued and bickered over strategy and its implementation. That 
they eventually pulled together, subordinating their differences for 
the greater cause, was mainly to the credit of the Supreme Com-
mander. Where is today's Dwight D. Eisenhower? 
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